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By Mercedes Cardona 
 
Lorie Logan is executive vice president in the Markets Group of the Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York, the System Open Market Account (SOMA) manager pro tem for the Federal Open 
Market Committee (FOMC), and head of Market Operations, Monitoring, and Analysis (MOMA). 
Ms. Logan played a prominent role in the development and implementation of the Federal 
Reserve’s crisis-fighting policies during 2007-09, including the expansion of the Federal 
Reserve’s balance sheet and the creation of liquidity facilities to mitigate systemic risks to the 
financial system. This “Lessons Learned” is based on an interview with Ms. Logan. 
Once the crisis has passed, the learning has to start and continue.  
Logan talked about how the NY Fed’s understanding and outreach to the financial markets 
has expanded both in size and in depth since the crisis. Before 2008, its activities in market 
analysis and monitoring had been very focused on the primary dealer community and the 
banks. Since the crisis, the regulators expanded their outreach and relationships across the 
financial sector to the buy-side and electronic trading firms:  
From an operational perspective, we took some really important lessons in terms of 
how to be ready and positioned. During the crisis we developed a number of new 
liquidity operations and tools. We wanted to be able to have a system for maintaining 
the ones that were most important through normal times to have them here and 
ready, but also to have other tools that maybe weren’t important in the 
implementation framework at the time but could be important under certain states 
of the world. So, we developed a full operational readiness framework for cataloging, 
for assessing which operations to have ready, and to maintain and to practice. 
Out of that came a regime of small-value testing that we do on a regular basis of tools 
that may not be important today but could be important in the future. Just recently, 
we needed to conduct repo operations again, which we hadn’t done in over a decade 
since the crisis. But we had been doing these small-value tests of them, and that was 
critically important in our ability to respond quickly in September.  
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Preparation is key to future readiness. 
Logan stressed that having distilled lessons from the crisis, it is critical that organizations 
work to keep that knowledge fresh and to expand upon it. She particularly pointed to three 
key areas: operational readiness, experienced personnel, and active learning:  
If I had to write a memo to myself, I would focus on at least three things. The first is 
around preparation and testing. Testing your operations, your infrastructure and 
your thinking. This really comes from lessons I took from the crisis that formed the 
basis of our operational readiness framework, our small-value testing process and 
lessons I’ve learned from the Applied Critical Thinking Team that Meg [McConnell] 
has developed. Doing regular tabletop exercises to stimulate your thinking about 
scenarios and getting comfortable making judgements with imperfect information 
along the way. So, preparation and spending a good amount of your time preparing 
for what could happen, as opposed to what you’re working on today. 
Another critical area that Logan cited was developing the right sort of experienced 
personnel: 
The second is really about people. My experience from the crisis is the sense to be 
surrounded with an experienced, diverse, well-rounded team. It’s really important to 
be around people who can come at a problem in different ways and who bring 
different viewpoints to the table. And that’s really important: to have a team that will 
challenge thinking, who aren’t afraid to bring up points and views that are different. 
This diversity of thought is just absolutely essential. 
Lastly, Logan pointed to a less concrete, but still vital, element that recognizes the essential 
nature of crises. They are unique, unpredictable, and require that fast-paced decisions be 
made with limited information. She stressed “active learning”  as key to the ability to perform 
under extreme pressure and uncertain circumstances. She expounded on these ideas  this 
way:   
And lastly, just a core principle of humility [is necessary]. You have to be humble 
about what you know and what you don’t know; to be curious about things you think 
you know about and things you don’t know about. And be flexible to make decisions 
and knowing that you’re making decisions most of the time with imperfect 
information. Having that humility and that curiosity will allow you to adjust in real 
time as more information comes in. 
A crisis will impact the organization in unexpected ways. 
Logan also talked about how the crisis impacted the Fed beyond its crisis fighting 
infrastructure. “There’s been a real and permanent shift in thinking about transparency and 
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accountability,” said Logan. “Transparency’s vitally important and is a key component of the 
way we think about the work that we do.” She continued:  
The market analysis and monitoring that we do has certainly changed. It was very 
focused on the primary dealer community and the banks and the dealers that we 
directly dealt with before the crisis, and since the crisis, we’ve really expanded our 
outreach and our relationship across the financial sector to the buy-side to electronic 
trading firms. Our whole understanding and outreach of the financial markets has 
expanded both in size and in depth. 
Logan believes that this cultural shift can be seen in all major areas of the Federal Reserve. 
She especially notes the shift in transparency citing the quarterly press conferences 
conducted by the Chairman, the summaries of economic projections that the Fed now issues, 
the stress-tests disclosures, and transaction-level data as examples of information sharing 
that serve to make the Fed less opaque.  
While acknowledging that some of these changes have come about because of statutory 
mandate, Logan credits the measures with not only changing the way the markets and public 
view the Fed but also with leading to important internal changes, such as enhanced cross-
departmental communication. She commented: 
On the monetary policy implementation side, where I have responsibility, 
there’s a lot more interaction between supervision and markets and 
understanding liquidity that was developed during the crisis and has been 
maintained. Those are just a few examples of ways that collaboration and 
communication have changed.  
Another valuable development has been enhanced communications across agencies through 
bodies such as the Financial Stability Oversight Council and informally, Logan said, 
From where I sit, [the Financial Stability Oversight Council] has been a really 
important development and has generated a lot more cross-agency 
communication even at the staff level but also in joint work that emanates 
from those relationships and from the committee itself. 
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